Linguistic Intuitions Revisited

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8399404
AutoresMichael Devitt (0000-0003-2298-2490, City University of New York, autor correspondente)
Ano2010
Volume61
Fascículo4
Páginas833-865
Data de publicação2010-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axq018
OpenAlexW2317086809
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas26

Why are linguistic intuitions good evidence for a grammar? In ‘Intuitions in Linguistics’ ([2006a]) and Ignorance of Language ([2006b]), I looked critically at some Chomskian answers and proposed another one. In this article, I respond to Fitzgerald’s ‘Linguistic Intuitions’ ([2010]), a sweeping critique of my position, and to Culbertson and Gross’ ‘Are Linguists Better Subjects?’ ([2009]), a criticism of one consequence of the position. In rejecting these criticisms, I emphasize that the issue over linguistic intuitions concerns only metalinguistic ones. And I argue that my critics, like many others, make too much of the distinction between grammaticality and acceptability intuitions. 1 Summary and Developments 1.1 Summary 1.2 ‘Intuitions’ in what sense? 1.3 Grammaticality versus acceptability 2 Fitzgerald 2.1 Do Chomskians subscribe to VoC? 2.2 The main case against VoC 2.3 Fitzgerald’s defense of VoC 2.4 Two additional criticisms of VoC 2.5 Fitzgerald’s criticisms of my alternative 2.6 Conclusion 3 Culbertson and Gross 3.1 Acceptability versus grammaticality 3.2 The experiment

Criticism · Epistemology · Explication · Grammar · Grammaticality · Ignorance · Linguistic description · Linguistics · Literature · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Theoretical linguistics · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation