Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8399512
AutoresElliott O Wagner, Elliott Wagner (University of California, Irvine, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume63
Fascículo3
Páginas547-575
Data de publicação2012-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axr039
OpenAlexW2122587433
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas19
Referências citadas29

Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their strategies according to the replicator dynamic. This system exhibits Hamiltonian chaos and trajectories do not converge to equilibria. This persistent out-of-equilibrium behaviour results in messages that do not perfectly reveal the sender's private information, but do transfer information as quantified by the Kullback–Leibler divergence. This finding shows that adaptive dynamics can enable information transmission even though messages at equilibria are meaningless. This suggests a new explanation for the evolution or spontaneous emergence of meaning: non-convergent adaptive dynamics. 1 Introduction 2 Lewis Signalling Games and Information Transfer 3 Evolution and Lewis Signalling Games 4 Signalling Games with Opposing Interests 5 Dynamics of Zero-Sum Signalling Games 6 Deterministic Chaos and Information Transfer 7 Conclusion

Communication source · Computer security · Epistemology · Information transfer · Information transmission · Mathematical economics · Meaning (existential) · Private information retrieval · Replicator equation · Signalling · Sociology · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Philosophy · Theoretical Computer Science