Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8399720 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kareem Khalifa (Middlebury College, autor correspondente), Gabriel Doble (Harvard University Press, autor correspondente), Jared Millson (0000-0001-5580-0580, Agnes Scott College, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 1439-1460 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axy048 |
| OpenAlex | W2799538447 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 10 |
| Referências citadas | 24 |
Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1. Introduction 2. Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems 3. Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together 4. Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism 4.1. High-grade necessity 4.2. Unity in diversity 5. Conclusion
Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Monism · Pluralism (philosophy) · Positive economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms
IsVerstehenScientific Understanding
Explanatory Asymmetry in Non-Causal Explanation
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation
Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation
Plumbing metaphysical explanatory depth
Thank you for misunderstanding
Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation
Explaining universality
Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena
Making Things Happen
Depth
Top-down Causation Without Top-down Causes
On “Minimal Model Explanations”
How dimensional analysis can explain
How scientific models can explain
Mechanistic and topological explanations
The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations
Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Noncausal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation
Reassessing Woodward’s Account of Explanation
Minimal Model Explanations
Because without Cause
On Explanations from Geometry of Motion
Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)
Minimal Models and the Generalized Ontic Conception of Scientific Explanation
Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation
Impossible Worlds
| Obras citantes distintas | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,43 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 9 |