Luck, Choice, and Educational Equality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8858845
AutoresJohn Calvert (0000-0001-9534-9456, University of Canterbury, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume47
Fascículo9
Páginas982-995
Data de publicação2015-07-08
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEducational Philosophy and Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-1857 • E-ISSN: 1469-5812
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00131857.2015.1044838
OpenAlexW1526963333
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas24

Harry Brighouse discusses two conceptions of educational equality. The first is a type of equality of opportunity, heavily influenced by the work of John Rawls, which he calls the meritocratic conception. According to this conception, an individual’s educational prospects should not be influenced by factors such as their social class background. The other, radical conception, suggests a person’s natural talents should not influence their educational prospects either. Brighouse favors the meritocratic conception, but this article argues that it is flawed and that the radical conception ought to be preferred. Although a superior conception of educational equality, the radical conception is still not quite right, so this article develops a luck egalitarian conception of educational equality. It is argued that this conception reflects much current thinking about equality and avoids some of the difficulties with Brighouse’s two conceptions. Finally, two objections to a luck egalitarian conception are considered

Economics · Epistemology · Higher education · Luck · Meritocracy · Natural (archaeology · Philosophy of education · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics