A Simple Model of Guilt with an Application to Unstaffed Roadside Stands

This paper introduces an analyses of the notion of guilt, the"bad feeling" we get when we harm someone. It is suggested that attempts to avoid the experience of guilt help to explain a variety of economic behaviors, such as those surrounding moral hazard in the workplace, voting, or criminal activities. A formal model of guilt is provided and used to explain the existence and other characteristics of unstaffed roadside stands

Economics · Epistemology · Feeling · Harm · Incentive · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Object (grammar) · Political science · Politics · Simple (philosophy) · Variety (cybernetics) · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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