The Ethics of Swearing

The Implications of Moral Theories for Oath-Breaking in Economic Contexts

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9256712
AutoresThaddeus Metz (0000-0001-9861-2408, University of Johannesburg, autor correspondente)
Ano2013
Volume71
Fascículo2
Páginas228-248
Data de publicação2013-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoReview of Social Economy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0034-6764 • E-ISSN: 1470-1162
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00346764.2013.799968
OpenAlexW1977983062
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas24

Many readers will share the judgement that, having made an oath, there is something morally worse about consequently performing the immoral action, such as embezzling, that one swore not to do. Why would it be worse? To answer this question, I consider three moral-theoretic accounts of why it is ‘extra’ wrong to violate oaths not to perform wrong actions, with special attention paid to those made in economic contexts. Specifically, I address what the moral theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and a new communitarian-relational principle entail for the wrongness of oath-breaking. I argue that the former two do not adequately capture why it is extra wrong to perform an immoral action that one swore not to do, but that the latter appeal to a morality of communal relationship offers a promising account

Action (physics) · Appeal · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Judgement · Morality · Oath · Political science · Sociology · Utilitarianism · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification