Short Supply Conditions and the Law of International Trade

Economic Lessons from the Pandemic

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9545818
AutoresAlan O Sykes (International Law Institute, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume114
Fascículo4
Páginas647-656
Data de publicação2020-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Journal of International Law (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0002-9300 • E-ISSN: 2161-7953
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/ajil.2020.61
OpenAlexW3121833754
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas3

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by shortages and potential shortages of products critical to the public health response. Many nations have responded with export restrictions on these products, restrictions that are permitted under international trade law as a temporary response to short supply conditions generally and to public health emergencies in particular. This Essay argues that such export restrictions are economically counterproductive from a global efficiency perspective, and that governments acting unilaterally will nevertheless employ them due to international externalities that propagate through the “terms of trade.” This observation raises a puzzle as to why international law should facilitate rather than curtail them. The most plausible answer is that legal authority for such measures is a politically necessary “escape clause” in trade agreements, akin to safeguard measures

Business · Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19 · Economic shortage · Economics · Externality · International economics · International trade · International trade law · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Pandemic · Perspective (graphical · Safeguard · World Trade Organization Law