Senecan ‘Meta-Stoicality’

In the Cognitive Grasp of Atreus

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9664848
AutoresJohn Stevens (0000-0002-9867-7209), John R Stevens (0000-0002-2908-7918, East Carolina University, autor correspondente)
Ano2018
Volume68
Fascículo2
Páginas573-590
Data de publicação2018-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Classical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0009-8388 • E-ISSN: 1471-6844
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0009838818000460
OpenAlexW2904626426
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas26

The first act of Thyestes is a challenge to the theory that the same Seneca wrote both the philosophica and the tragedies. We are compelled by the evil genius of Atreus and not by the common virtue of his Satelles . Atreus not only feels no compunction at his words, but seems to hone his evil from the prodding. It is the death of philosophy, the anti-mirror of the prince: the tyrant is not reformed, but becomes more himself—more perfectly tyrannical. It is a performance of Socrates’ monster in Republic 9—the soul composed of a hydra of desires with its ring of heads constantly changing, a lion of anger and a small man, who is to domesticate the hydra like a farmer and befriend the lion (588c–589b). The ineffectual Satelles portrays the hopeless plight of Plato's ‘little man reason’ before a lion with monstrous desires like Atreus. There is a place left for philosophy to win over the tyrant only if the Satelles does not represent all that reason can do, and stands instead only for gentlemanly virtue or common sense, which lacks the kind of logos needed to control the beast

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