Davidson on Pure Intending

I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content

Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Judgement · Meaning (existential) · Reductionism · Subject (documents) · Wright · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

• Intention and Judgment-Dependence

  Ali Hossein Khani•Philosophical Explorations•2024

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• Truth and Interpretation

  Ernest Lepore•Truth and Interpretation•1989

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• Willing, Wanting, Waiting

  Richard Holton•Willing, wanting, waiting•2009

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• Knowledge and its Limits

  T Williamson•Knowledge and Its Limits•2002

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• Springs Of Action

  Alfred R Mele•Springs of action•1992

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• Knowing One's Own Mind

  Donald Davidson•Proceedings and Addresses of the…•1987

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• Rational Animals

  Open Access•Donald Davidson•dialectica•1982

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• The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity

  Corine Besson, Daniel Star•Oxford Handbook of Reasons and…•2018

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• Intention and Agency

  Open Access•Donald Gustafson, Donald F Gustafson•Intention and Agency•1986

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• The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays

  Open Access•Sydney Shoemaker•First-Person Perspective and…•1996

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• The Philosophy of Michael Dummett

  Open Access•B F McGuinness, Brian McGuinness et al.•Philosophy of Michael Dummett•1994

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• Faces of Intention

  Open Access•Michael E Bratman•Faces of Intention•1999

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• The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

  Ernest Lepore, Ernie Lepore et al.•Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of…•2008

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• Realism and Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of Language, II

  Open Access•Frederick Stoutland•Critica•1982

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• Realism and Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of Language, I

  Open Access•Frederick Stoutland•Critica•1982

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• Davidson on Self‐Knowledge

  Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2021

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• Intending

  Monroe C Beardsley•Values and Morals•1978

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• Ways of Meaning

  Katarzyna M Jaszczolt, Mark Platts•Language•1998

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• Interpretationism and judgement-dependence

  Open Access•Ali Hossein Khani•Synthese•2021

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• Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

  Open Access•Alexander Miller•Synthese•2009

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• Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind

  Alfred R Mele, Alfred Mele et al.•The Philosophical Review•1995

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• Essays on Davidson

  Jennifer Hornsby, Bruce Vermazen et al.•The Philosophical Quarterly•1986

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• Literary Theory after Davidson

  Arnd Wedemeyer, Reed Way Dasenbrock•Modern Language Notes•1993

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• The Judgment of a Weak Will

  Sergio Tenenbaum•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1999

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• Action, Emotion and Will

  Anthony Kenny•Action, Emotion and Will•2003

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• Actions, Reasons, and Causes

  Donald Davidson•The Journal of Philosophy•1963

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• Best Opinion and Intentional States

  Jim Edwards•The Philosophical Quarterly•1992

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• Davidson on First-Person Authority

  P M S Hacker•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997

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• Triangulating With Davidson

  Claudine Verheggen•The Philosophical Quarterly•2007

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