On Interrogative Inquiries Without Suspended Judgement and Doxastic Neutrality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9686872
AutoresLeonardo Flamini (University of Zurich, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Páginas1-20
Data de publicação2024-10-11
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217324000325
OpenAlexW4403317264
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas32

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one's judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman's perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist

Cognitive psychology · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Interrogative · Judgement · Linguistics · Neutrality · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology