Mythical Mythology

I defend a referential anti-realist solution to the problem of intentional identity. I develop Nathan Salmon's referential realist solution to the problem — according to which mythical objects exist and we can refer to them by using mythical-object names — and consider David Braun's objections to it. I argue that Salmon's solution yields the real identity, rather than the intentional identity, of the objects of multiple subjects’ thoughts. And I develop a referential anti-realist variant of Salmon's view — according to which mythical objects do not exist nor are they otherwise real but we can nevertheless refer to them — which avoids this worry

Aesthetics · Art · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Literature · Mythology · Realism · Folklore, Mythology, and Literature Studies · Philosophy · Religious Studies and Spiritual Practices

• Existence

  Nathan Salmon•Philosophical Perspectives•1987

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• Two Kinds of Intentionality

  P T Geach, Sherwood J B Sugden•The Monist•1976

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• Mimesis as Make-Believe

  Kendall L Walton•Poetics Today•1991

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• The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse

  John R Searle•New Literary History•1975

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• Speech Acts

  Open Access•John R Searle•Speech acts•1969

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