The Rationality of Emotions Across Time

Philosophers have struggled to explain the mismatch of emotions and their objects across time, as when we stop grieving or feeling angry despite the persistence of the underlying cause. I argue for a sceptical approach that says that these emotional changes often lack rational fit. The key observation is that our emotions must periodically reset for purely functional reasons that have nothing to do with fit. I compare this account to David Hume’s sceptical approach in matters of belief, and conclude that resistance to it rests on a confusion similar to one that he identifies

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Rationality · Cultural Differences and Values · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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