Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9688247
AutoresVÍCTOR M VERDEJO (0000-0002-7872-0206, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, autor correspondente)
Ano2014
Volume53
Fascículo1
Páginas109-133
Data de publicação2014-03-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217313000875
OpenAlexW2130187152
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas24

Concept-individuating possession conditions constitute one of the fundamental, albeit rather unattended, polemical territories between Fregean and anti-individualistic standpoints. In this paper, I outline a compatibilist theory of cognitive value that encompasses both anti-individualistic and individualistic possession conditions. I argue that this general approach to the compatibility of Fregean and anti-individualistic accounts of concept possession suffices to call into question the claims that cognitive value must have deference and transparency among its fundamental features

Cognition · Compatibilism · Deference · Determinism · Epistemology · Individualism · Linguistics · Political science · Possession (linguistics) · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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