Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9688623 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Mark Walker (0000-0002-0507-1954, New Mexico State University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 285-309 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-08-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217322000117 |
| OpenAlex | W4220704376 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 31 |
Epistemic uniqueness is the view that there is at most one rational doxastic response to a given batch of evidence E, while epistemic permissiveness is the denial of epistemic uniqueness. As several authors have noted, one of the attractions of epistemic permissiveness is that it allows us to believe that more than one doxastic response may be rationally faultless, and so permits us to respect the epistemic credentials of all parties to a dispute. I argue that permissiveness is unable to deliver on this claimed benefit in many philosophical disputes
Denial · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Permissiveness · Psychoanalysis · Uniqueness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Altamente citado | Não |
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