Universalization or Threat Advantage? The Difficult Dialogue between Discourse Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice

In A Theory of Justice , Rawls claims that “to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice.” Although it may indeed seem intuitively plausible that a principle based on “threat advantage” cannot count as a principle of justice, it is an altogether different matter to explain why this is so. The question is especially pressing if one bears in mind that such a principle of bargaining in fact underlies many institutionally regulated interactions. Moreover, to the extent that morality is thought of as a mechanism for guaranteeing mutual advantage in the resolution of conflicts, it may indeed seem necessary that it reflect the bargaining power of the parties (in order to make sure that it is indeed advantageous for all of them). In fact, there is a prominent tradition of social-contract theories (from Hobbes to Gauthier) that work under this assumption and claim to provide an answer to what justice requires as much as Rawls's theory does. So seen, the burden of proof seems to fall rather on the shoulders of those committed to claim both that morality is a mechanism that works to the advantage of all and that it nevertheless requires neutralizing all differences in bargaining power

Economic Justice · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mechanism (biology) · Morality · Order (exchange) · Original position · Political science · Power (physics) · Sociology · Universalization · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory

• A Theory of Justice

  John Rawls•Theory of Justice•1971

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• Justice As Impartiality

  Brian M Barry, Brian Barry•Justice as impartiality•1995

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• Between Facts and Norms

  Jürgen Habermas•Between Facts and Norms•1996

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