Can Enumerative Induction Be Defended by Modal Scepticism and Modal Empiricism

In the spirit of modal scepticism, Peter Hawke offers a modal epistemology, the safe explanation theory (SET), which takes the form of modal empiricism. By employing SET, he tries to defend enumerative induction (EI): it is reasonable to believe that any X is F on the basis of a sufficiently large sample in which any X is F. In this paper, I argue that Hawke’s defence fails. Moreover, I point out a problem with SET, which results in this failure: SET is too strict to account for some possibility claims that we are entitled to believe

Empiricism · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Modal · Set (abstract data type) · Skepticism · Chemistry · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

• Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism

  Open Access•Tuomas E Tahko•Modal Epistemology after…•2017

  Incluir item

• Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

  Open Access•Peter Hawke•Modal Epistemology after…•2017

  Incluir item

• Similarity and Possibility

  Open Access•Sonia Roca-Royes•Modal Epistemology after…•2017

  Incluir item

• Real Natures and Familiar Objects

  Crawford L Elder•Real Natures and Familiar Objects•2004

  Incluir item

• Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?

  David J Chalmers•Conceivability and possibility•2002

  Incluir item

• Causal and Metaphysical Necessity

  Open Access•Sydney Shoemaker•Pacific philosophical quarterly•1998

  Incluir item

• The Epistemology of Modality

  Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, Mario Wallner et al.•A Companion to Epistemology•2025

  Incluir item

• Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance

  George Bealer•Conceivability and possibility•2002

  Incluir item

• Introduction

  Tamar Szab ó Gendler, John Hawthorne•Conceivability and possibility•2002

  Incluir item

• Concepts, Experience and Modal Knowledge1

  Open Access•Carrie Jenkins•Philosophical Perspectives•2010

  Incluir item

• Modal scepticism, Yablo-style conceivability, and analogical reasoning

  Open Access•Peter Hartl•Synthese•2016

  Incluir item

• Abduction and Modality

  Open Access•Stephen Biggs•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2010

  Incluir item

• Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility

  Stephen Yablo•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1993

  Incluir item

• Imagining as a Guide to Possibility

  Open Access•Peter Kung•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2010

  Incluir item