Rational Choice for Machines

Why be moral? The question is very old. It takes many forms and is subject to many interpretations. On one interpretation, the question does not make sense (failed presupposition); to ask it is evidence of misunderstanding. This view is not as popular as it once was. The more fashionable answer today is that we have reasons to be moral. These reasons may themselves be moral, or they may be non-moral. In the first case, we may not have the answer we wanted to our question. If we think of reasons as considerations favouring a course of action, decisively in the absence of other reasons, then the fact that there are moral reasons to act morally merely tells us that there are moral considerations in favour of acts required or recommended by morality. It leaves open the question of whether we act against or contrary to reason simpliciter when we fail to act as we morally should. By contrast, if there are non-moral reasons to act morally, then to refrain from doing what is morally required of us is a failure of reason; it is to act contrary to the considerations relevant to the choices one faces

Action (physics) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Moral disengagement · Moral responsibility · Morality · Normative · Presupposition · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

• Rationality and Dynamic Choice

  Open Access•Edward F Mcclennen•Rationality and Dynamic Choice•1990

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