Respect-Worthiness and Dignity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9690339
AutoresCarol Hay (University of Massachusetts Lowell, autor correspondente)
Ano2013
Volume51
Fascículo4
Páginas587-612
Data de publicação2013-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217313000073
OpenAlexW2151010083
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas15

I argue that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. To avoid this conclusion, I argue that, contrary to the received view among Kant scholars, the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature in virtue of which she is owed the respect that constrains how she may be treated. Even though someone who fails to attempt to protect her rational nature fails to respect herself, and even though this moral failing does make her lose a certain kind of value, her obligations to respect herself remain

Dignity · Epistemology · Feature (linguistics) · Law and economics · Moral obligation · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Virtue · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification