Wage Interactions

This paper examines the role played by wage comparisons in pay bargaining when workers have a fall-back option. The effect on wages due to wage comparisons can be difficult to distinguish from the effect of the fall-back wage. It is shown that the use of wages of a recognised ‘pay leader' resolves this problem. The empirical work employs a unique panel of data covering 321 unionised bargaining units in the UK chemicals industry between 1978 and 1989. Results support anecdotal reports of pay leadership and suggest that wages elsewhere matter because comparisons are important to workers. In this sense, the results support the notion that ‘fairness considerations' drive wage interactions

Collective bargaining · Economics · Efficiency wage · Labour economics · Wage · Wage bargaining · Work (physics · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions

• Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses

  Russell Davidson, James G MacKinnon•Econometrica•1981

  Incluir item

• Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics

  Matthew Rabin•2011

  Incluir item

• Inventory Accumulation, Wages, and Employment

  Simon Clark•The Economic Journal•1991

  Incluir item

• Pay Determination and Industrial Prosperity

  Kelly Knight, K G Knight et al.•The Economic Journal•1990

  Incluir item

• Fairness, Collective Bargaining, and Incomes Policy

  Charles Mulvey, Paul Willman•The Economic Journal•1983

  Incluir item

• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

  George A Akerlof, Janet L Yellen•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•1990

  Incluir item

• Towards an understanding of inequity

  J Stacy Adams•Journal of Abnormal & Social…•1963

  Incluir item

• Pay Determination and Industrial Prosperity

  Christopher L Erickson, Alan A Carruth et al.•Industrial and Labor Relations…•1993

  Incluir item