Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9703354
AutoresKaushik Basu (0000-0002-3705-055X), Arnab K Basu (0000-0002-1388-0735, Cornell University, IZA, ZEF), Nancy H Chau (0000-0002-9843-5111, Cornell University, IZA, ZEF), Ravi Kanbur (0000-0001-8964-3333, Cornell University, CEPR, IZA)
Ano2015
Volume125
Fascículo589
Páginas1534-1573
Data de publicação2015-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12222
OpenAlexW2239180058
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas46

We develop a search‐theoretic model of contractual dualism in formal and informal labour markets. The model (i) provides the micro‐underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and informal sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent set‐up whereby a host of salient features of developing country labour markets can be explained together and (iii) places for the first time the Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimising) minimum wage in the broader context of labour markets where formal job creation is costly, where employer market power is endogenous and where formal employment, informal employment and unemployment coexist

Context (archaeology · Dualism · Economics · Informal sector · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Minimum wage · Power (physics · Salient · Unemployment · Wage · Employment and Welfare Studies · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Taxation and Compliance Studies