Collective Rent Dissipation
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9704818 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Shmuel Nitzan (0000-0002-5523-7350, Bar-Ilan University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1991 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Fascículo | 409 |
| Páginas | 1522 |
| Data de publicação | 1991-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2234901 |
| OpenAlex | W4238895675 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 60 |
Journal Article Collective Rent Dissipation Get access Shmuel Nitzan Shmuel Nitzan Bar-Ilan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 409, 1 November 1991, Pages 1522–1534, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234901 Published: 01 November 1991
Dissipation · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Physics · Volume (thermodynamics · Economic theories and models
Contest success functions
Modelling rent-seeking contests
Optimal prize allocations in group contests
Formation of teams in contests
Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict
Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest
Litigation with adversarial efforts
On the disruptive power of small-teams research
The role of noise variance on effort in group contests
The Collective Action Problem
Non-deterministic group contest with private information
Productive and unproductive competition
Where are the rent seekers
On the Stability of Group Formation
Group cooperation against a hegemon
Social welfare and the group size paradox
On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests
The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R>2
Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking
Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods
Hostile takeover and costly merger control
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty
Constitutional Prohibitions in a Rent Seeking Model
Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees
Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts
A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest
On the economic theory of interest groups
Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
Rent-seeking in natural resource quota allocations
Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy in Contests
Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations
Foreclosure in contests
Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods
Would you trust lobbies
Stag hunt contests and alliance formation
Policy Reform and the Free-Rider Problem
Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking
Contests Among Bureaucrats
The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation
Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers
Public good provision in a repeated game
Sabotage in team contests
How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking
Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests
Changes in budgetary allocations and international comparisons of the social cost of rent-seeking
Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment
Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models
Political economy and political correctness
A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rules
Individual welfare and the group size paradox
Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players
Two-stage group rent-seeking with negatively interdependent preferences
The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests
Insecure Property and Technological Backwardness
Risk Aversion in Rent‐Seeking and Rent‐Augmenting Games
Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange
Motivating political support with group-based rewards
Bending the Iron Law
Intra-Level and Inter-Level Interaction
Rent seeking and collusion in the military allocation decisions of Finland, Sweden, and Great Britain, 1920-381
| Obras citantes distintas | 60 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,88 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 60 |