Underground Gun Markets

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9706629
AutoresPhilip J Cook (0000-0001-5094-9052, Duke University and NBER), Jens Ludwig (0000-0002-2998-1696, University of Chicago and NBER), Sudhir Venkatesh (Columbia University), Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh (Columbia University), Anthony A Braga (0000-0002-5815-3734, Harvard University)
Ano2007
Volume117
Fascículo524
PáginasF588-F618
Data de publicação2007-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02098.x
OpenAlexW2903472367
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas28
Referências citadas30

This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun market is both illegal and “thin†the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gangâ€TMs economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached

Black market · Business · Criminology · Government (linguistics · Gun violence · Poison control · Political science · Renting · Sociology · Suicide prevention · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Gun Ownership and Violence Research · Law