A Generalised Model of Monopsony

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9707438
AutoresAlan Manning (0000-0002-7884-3580, London School of Economics and Political Science, autor correspondente)
Ano2006
Volume116
Fascículo508
Páginas84-100
Data de publicação2006-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01048.x
OpenAlexW2163655788
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas15

This article presents a general but very simple model in which the supply of labour to an individual employer is not infinitely elastic but the employer can also raise employment by increasing expenditure on recruitment. Using this, it is shown how that division between perfect competition and monopsony is whether there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment. Using a unique British data set containing information on both labour turnover costs and the number of recruits we present estimates that do suggest that there is an increasing marginal cost of recruitment. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society

Economic history · Economics · Monopsony · Neoclassical economics · Economic theories and models · Firm Innovation and Growth · ICT Impact and Policies