Regulation with wage bargaining
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9709364 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dag Morten Dalen (0000-0001-7410-8442, Norwegian School of Management), Nils-Henrik M Von Der Fehr (University of Oslo), Nils‐Henrik M von der Fehr (University of Oslo), Espen R Moen (0000-0003-2085-4874, Norwegian School of Management) |
| Ano | 2003 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Fascículo | 487 |
| Páginas | 525-538 |
| Data de publicação | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00126 |
| OpenAlex | W3123558343 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 11 |
In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent‐sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime
Bargaining power · Collective bargaining · Economics · Efficiency wage · Empirical evidence · Incentive · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Wage · Wage bargaining · Labor Movements and Unions · Merger and Competition Analysis · Transport and Economic Policies
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |