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Independent Private Value Auctions

Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9714593
AutoresJohn H Kagel (0000-0002-6870-814X, University of Pittsburgh), Dan Levin (0000-0002-8274-6337, University of Houston)
Ano1993
Volume103
Fascículo419
Páginas868
Data de publicação1993-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2234706
OpenAlexW2096423350
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas4

The symmetric equilibrium of third-price auctions is characterized. It makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second-price auctions: bids exceed private values, the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one, increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids, and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. In the experiment, bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory. However, the game theoretic models correctly anticipate, at least directionally, the important effects of the price rule changes. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society

Auction theory · Bid shading · Business · Common value auction · Economics · English auction · Generalized second-price auction · Microeconomics · Statistics · Unique bid auction · Value (mathematics · Vickrey auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics

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Obras citantes distintas12
Citações por ano0,38
Intervalo de citações1994 - 2025 (32)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 12
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