Opportunities as Chances

Maximising the Probability that Everybody Succeeds

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9715237
AutoresMarco Mariotti (0000-0002-5308-5154, Queen Mary University of London), Roberto Veneziani (0000-0001-6431-0145, Queen Mary University of London)
Ano2018
Volume128
Fascículo611
Páginas1609-1633
Data de publicação2018-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12467
OpenAlexW1926351148
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas37

Opportunities in society are commonly interpreted as `chances of success'. Within this interpretation, should opportunities be equalised? We show that a liberal principle of justice and a limited principle of social rationality imply that opportunity profiles should be evaluated by means of a `Nash' criterion. The interpretation is new: the social objective should be to maximise the chance that everybody in society succeeds. In particular, the failure of even only one individual must be considered maximally detrimental. We also study a refinement of this criterion and its extension to problems of intergenerational justice

Economic Justice · Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Law and economics · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Public economics · Rationality · Social choice theory · Social justice · Social Welfare · Welfare · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law