Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9715239 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Peter J Hammond (0000-0003-1125-3612, Stanford University, autor correspondente), Jerry R Green, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean‐jacques Laffont |
| Ano | 1980 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Fascículo | 358 |
| Páginas | 407 |
| Data de publicação | 1980-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2231809 |
| OpenAlex | W1981329484 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 46 |
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 Published: 01 June 1980
Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Library science · Management · Microeconomics · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Public Administration
Sharing and expanding the co-benefits of conservation
Public Goods
Markets and Freedoms
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods
The Economist as Engineer
A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
Strength in numbers
Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
What Did You Learn in the World Today
Toward Restructuring of Normative Economics
Retail Electricity Competition
On Robust Constitution Design
Government and the provision of public goods
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
Non-cooperative implementation
Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good
Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods
A Constitution for Solving Asymmetric Externality Games
A decentralized mechanism for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities
On the optimal number of representatives
Moral public choice
Efficient public goods provision with incomplete markets
Free-rider effects in rent-seeking groups competing for public goods
On the Margolis ?thought experiment,? and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions
A note on demand-revealing
Public Preferences for Marine Fisheries Enhancement
Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat
Information imparfaite et économie publique
Package Bidding
Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents
Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay
Coalitional Power and Public Goods
Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
The Internal Economy of Large Firms
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics
A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy
Implementing efficiency with equality
| Obras citantes distintas | 46 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,05 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1982 - 2025 (44) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 45 |