Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions

An Experimental Study

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9715531
AutoresRegina Betz (University of Bayreuth), Ben Greiner (0000-0002-4493-8100, UNSW Sydney), Sascha Schweitzer (0000-0003-4154-6010, Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften), Stefan Seifert (0000-0002-5139-9096, Vienna University of Economics and Business)
Ano2017
Volume127
Fascículo605
PáginasF351-F371
Data de publicação2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12403
OpenAlexW80902378
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas29

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first

Auction theory · Business · Common value auction · Economics · English auction · Forward auction · Generalized second-price auction · Microeconomics · Multiunit auction · Reverse auction · Sequence (biology · Unique bid auction · Unit (ring theory · Vickrey auction · Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Chemistry · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Mathematics · Supply Chain and Inventory Management