Changing Tastes and Effective Consistency

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9718013
AutoresLarry Selden (Columbia University), Xiao Wei (0000-0003-3534-8835, University of Pennsylvania)
Ano2016
Volume126
Fascículo595
Páginas1912-1946
Data de publicação2016-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12312
OpenAlexW3124005751
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas38

In a single commodity setting with changing tastes, an individual’s consumption plan can be obtained using naïve or sophisticated choice. We provide two sufficient conditions for when the solutions are unique and agree and the common plan is representable by a non‐changing tastes utility. Because the solution is not revised over time, the plan and associated preferences are referred to as being effectively consistent. Afriat‐style revealed preference tests are derived. The assumption of effective consistency can mitigate the problems of vulnerability to Dutch Books, non‐existence of a competitive equilibrium and the aggregation of heterogeneous agents with changing tastes

Commodity · Consistency (knowledge bases · Consumption (sociology · Economics · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Plan (archaeology · Preference · Revealed preference · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Economic theories and models