Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages

The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9726593
AutoresSteffen Huck (0000-0001-7586-7985, University College London), Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Freie Universität Berlin), Wieland Müller (0000-0003-0353-2486, Tilburg University)
Ano2004
Volume71
Fascículo284
Páginas575-587
Data de publicação2004-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00389.x
OpenAlexW2270336591
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas14

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare‐improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm. This induces a commitment advantage for the merged firm

Business · Competitor analysis · Economics · Geometry · Horizontal and vertical · Industrial organization · Market economy · Market structure · Microeconomics · Welfare · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic Policies and Impacts · Marketing · Mathematics · Merger and Competition Analysis