Productivity, Factor Transfers and Economic Growth in the UK

In a principal-monitor-agent model we show that the principal’s choice of the timing to monitor the agent presents a trade-off. On the one hand, a signal from an ex ante monitor (supervisor) provides flexibility in contracting (since both output and wages can be contracted on this signal). On the other hand, a signal from an ex post monitor (auditor) can be used to punish the agent. Auditing is optimal when (i) strong punishment schemes can be implemented and enforced by courts or (ii) when punishment instruments are not expected to be strong and the monitor’s signal is noisy. Supervising is optimal otherwise

Agricultural economics · Economics · Factor (programming language) · Macroeconomics · Natural resource economics · Productivity · Total factor productivity · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy

• Testing Against General Autoregressive and Moving Average Error Models when the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables

  L G Godfrey•Econometrica•1978

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• Economic Growth and the Verdoorn Law--A Comment on Mr Rowthorn's Article

  Nicholas Kaldor•The Economic Journal•1975

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• Differences in Growth Rates and Kaldor's Laws

  A Parikh•Economica•1978

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• Rowthorn's Interpretation of Verdoorn's Law

  A P Thirlwall•The Economic Journal•1980

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• What Remains of Kaldor's Law

  Robert Rowthorn, R E Rowthorn•The Economic Journal•1975

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• Verdoorn's Law in Retrospect

  P J Verdoorn•The Economic Journal•1980

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