Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9727803
AutoresMARTIN ALTEMEYER‐BARTSCHER, Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher (Chemnitz University of Technology), Dirk Rübbelke (0000-0002-9934-8570, CICERO Center for International Climate Research), DIRK T G RÜBBELKE, Eytan Sheshinski (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ano2010
Volume77
Fascículo308
Páginas775-784
Data de publicação2010-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00796.x
OpenAlexW1914488627
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas20

International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free‐rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side‐payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side‐payments, in turn, are self‐financed by means of externality‐correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto‐efficient outcome can be attained

Business · Coase theorem · Economics · Externality · Free rider problem · Free riding · Incentive · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Order (exchange) · Pareto principle · Payment · Private good · Public economics · Public good · Transaction cost · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Economic theories and models · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law