Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic Landlords

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9727986
AutoresKaushik Basu (0000-0002-3705-055X, Cornell University), Patrick M Emerson (0000-0002-6429-893X, University of Colorado Denver)
Ano2003
Volume70
Fascículo278
Páginas223-232
Data de publicação2003-05-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-0335.t01-1-00280
OpenAlexW3123433803
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas10

This paper presents a model of ‘tenancy rent control’ where rent increases on, and evictions of, sitting tenants are prohibited but nominal rents for new tenants are unrestricted. If there is any inflation, landlords prefer to take short‐staying tenants. If there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant's type, an adverse selection problem arises. If landlords have monoply power, then they may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing. These ‘efficiency rents’ show that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were a flat ceiling on rents

Adverse selection · Economic rent · Economics · Leasehold estate · Microeconomics · Monopolistic competition · Monopoly · Rent-seeking · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Housing Market and Economics · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism

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