The Soviet Union and the Israeli action in Lebanon

The Soviet Union may have some questions to answer from its friends and allies in the Middle East at the close of the current crisis in Lebanon. Given the massive material and political support Moscow has accorded both Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the past, it is possible that they, or at least groups amongst their supporters and the public at large, expected something more than the virtual inaction of the Soviet Union. An understanding of this inaction, however, lies with the understanding of the nature of Soviet commitment to Syria and the PLO and where this commitment fits into Soviet priorities. When Israeli forces moved into Lebanon, the primary Soviet consideration was that there should not be a general war between Israel and Syria. The reasons for this were numerous: Moscow was fearful of the tlhreat to Damascus itself and to the shaky regime of Assad; it was concerned that the Israeli blow and these threats would be such as to prompt the Syrians to demand direct Soviet military intervention and that an all-out war, similar to previous wars in the region, would develop with the risk of superpower involvement and confrontation. Accordingly, Moscow has always drawn a distinction in the Arab-Israeli context between terrorist actions or battles of attrition, and all-out wars, opposing the latter because of the concern over superpower confrontation. In the present war, these Soviet preferences presumably caused little difficulty between Moscow and Damascus in as much as the Syrians themselves apparently were not interested in all-out war with Israel. Thus it was not a case of Syria pressing to fight and Moscow holding it back, but, perhaps, Syrian pressure on Moscow, possibly from the beginning of hostilities, to press Washington to restrain Israel. The USSR may have been restrained on this score by their general concern over their relations with the United States at this time of important arms talks. There have been rumours that the Syrians were dissatisfied with Moscow's general reticence during the hostilities and in some circles, presumably the military, there was apparently much grumbling over the poor performance of Soviet weapons systems.' While Libyan and Palestinian leaders openly indicated their disappointment that Moscow did not send Syria concrete assistance, such as a contingent of combat troops, the Syrians themselves, at least publicly, couched their demands in political terms.2 They spoke of raising Soviet-Syrian relations to a still higher plane

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• Soviet arms‐transfer policy and the decision to upgrade Syrian air defences

  Cynthia A Roberts•Survival•1983

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