Building Local Integrity Systems in Southern Europe
The case of urban local corruption in Spain
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9962261 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Mónica García Quesada (0000-0003-3883-3035, University of Dundee, autor correspondente), Francisco Javier Sánchez (0000-0002-7273-4332, Universidad de Murcia), Fernando Jiménez-Sánchez (Universidad de Murcia), Manuel Villoria Mendieta (0000-0002-1055-1995, University Rey Juan Carlos, Spain), Manuel Villoria (0000-0002-5462-5781) |
| Ano | 2013 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 618-637 |
| Data de publicação | 2013-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | International Review of Administrative Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0020-8523 • E-ISSN: 1461-7226 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852313501125 |
| OpenAlex | W2070422866 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 20 |
| Referências citadas | 18 |
From 1997 to 2007, Spain suffered from major cases of political corruption associated with local urban development. To analyse their causes, this article examines the institutional mechanisms designed to monitor and control the performance of local policy-makers and to ensure they operated independently from private influence. It also analyses their actual effectiveness with reference to particular cases of local corruption unveiled during that decade. The Spanish case shows that local representatives had a large amount of power in distributing financial gains within the municipality, but faced little pressure to account for their actions. It argues that insufficient control mechanisms on the activities of local representatives from 1997 to 2007 can adequately explain the intensity and spread of local corruption in Spain
Business · Control (management · Economics · Language change · Local authority · Local Development · Local government · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Regional science · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Public Administration
Ethics and Integrity
Corrupción, crecimiento e instituciones
The ethics of maxima and minima combined with social justice as a form of public corruption prevention
Planning Corruption or Corrupting Planning
Marco para entender y atender la corrupción sistémica en gobiernos locales
Framework to understand and address the systemic corruption in local governments
How “Rational” Is Urban Public Corruption
Do they really care? Social desirability bias in attitudes towards corruption
Recentralization and vertical alignment in the French health‐care system
What has happened in Spain? The real estate bubble, corruption and housing development
Identifying Corruption Risk
The dark side of cultural policy
Rent-seeking Practices in the Housing Development Approval Process
Corruption and the quality of transportation infrastructure
The effects of performance evaluation on punishment in organisations
La spirale des affaires
The Iron Triangle of Urban Entrepreneurialism
Corruption risk analysis in local public procurement
L'analyse des risques éthiques
Sistema de integridade local no Brasil
The Quality of Government
Leadership At The Apex
Responsive Regulation
Culture and Institutions
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Judging a Public Official’s Integrity
Controlling Corruption
Corruption
From Greek Temple to Bird's Nest
A Qualitative Investigation of Perceived Executive Ethical Leadership
Building Boom and Political Corruption in Spain
Public Corruption in Swedish Municipalities – Trouble Looming on the Horizon
What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research
Local Integrity Systems
The quality of government
| Obras citantes distintas | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,22 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 20 |