Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics

Journal Data

TypeJOURNAL
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH (DE)
ISSN1935-1704 / 2194-6124
Scopus8300153204
OpenAlexS165881774
MAG165881774
Websitehttps://api.elsevier.com/content/serial/title/issn/2194-6124
Total publications7
Coverage period2006 - 2016
CountryDE
LanguageEN
IndexingScopus indexed
Cited by1
SJR0.187 (Q3)
SNIP0.39
CiteScore0.8
h-index1
Female authorship share19.4%

This journal focuses on theoretical economics. While economic anthropology exists, this venue's emphasis on abstract economic theory places it in the broader social science category with only occasional, indirect intersection with social anthropology

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) · Auction Theory and Applications · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Corporate Finance and Governance · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Digital Platforms and Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation

  • Better Product Quality May Lead to Lower Product Price

    Regis Chenavaz•ARTICLE•2016

    This article analyzes the conditions under which better product quality implies higher or lower product price. In an optimal control framework, I make the following assumptions: The firm sets the dynamic pricing and product innovation policies; product innovation raises quality, which drives production cost, and consumers are sensitive to price and quality. I derive a rule of price-quality relationship that stresses the influence of quality on pr…

  • Learning, Words and Actions

    Nicolas Jacquemet, Adam Zylbersztejn•ARTICLE•2013

    We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choice…

  • The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies

    Jean‐marc Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau et al.•ARTICLE•2011

    In an economy with a non-convex production sector, we provide an assumption on each individual producer, which implies that the survival assumption holds true at the aggregate level for general pricing rules. For the marginal pricing rule, we derive this assumption from the bounded marginal productivity of inputs. We apply this approach to intertemporal economies and we show how our assumption fits well with the time structure. We obtain a tracta…

  • Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum

    Dmitry Taubinsky•ARTICLE•2011

    We study a model of opinion formation and analyze the link between network architecture and the “left-right spectrum” that frequently characterizes opinions and beliefs. We correct a key result of DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (QJE, 2003) who claim that after some time, an agent’s position on a set of different issues will always be either “left” on all of those issues or “right” on all of those issues. We provide counterexamples to this claim and…

  • Social Learning in Social Networks

    Pj Lamberson•ARTICLE•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 12

    This paper analyzes a model of social learning in a social network. Agents decide whether or not to adopt a new technology with unknown payoffs based on their prior beliefs and the experiences of their neighbors in the network. Using a mean-field approximation, we prove that the diffusion process always has at least one stable equilibrium, and we examine the dependence of the set of equilibria on the model parameters and the structure of the netw…

  • Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods

    Jernej Čopič, Matthew O Jackson et al.•ARTICLE•2009

    Networks of social and economic interactions are often influenced by unobserved structures among the nodes. Based on a simple model of how an unobserved community structure generates networks of interactions, we axiomatize a method of detecting the latent community structures from network data. The method is based on maximum likelihood estimation

  • Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information

    Georges Casamatta, Wilfried Sand‐Zantman et al.•ARTICLE•2006

    We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to a…

  • Social Learning in Social Networks

    Pj Lamberson•ARTICLE•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 12

    This paper analyzes a model of social learning in a social network. Agents decide whether or not to adopt a new technology with unknown payoffs based on their prior beliefs and the experiences of their neighbors in the network. Using a mean-field approximation, we prove that the diffusion process always has at least one stable equilibrium, and we examine the dependence of the set of equilibria on the model parameters and the structure of the netw…

  • Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information

    Georges Casamatta, Wilfried Sand‐Zantman et al.•ARTICLE•2006

    We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to a…

  • Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods

    Jernej Čopič, Matthew O Jackson et al.•ARTICLE•2009

    Networks of social and economic interactions are often influenced by unobserved structures among the nodes. Based on a simple model of how an unobserved community structure generates networks of interactions, we axiomatize a method of detecting the latent community structures from network data. The method is based on maximum likelihood estimation

  • Social Learning in Social Networks

    Pj Lamberson•ARTICLE•2010•Cited by: 1•References: 12

    This paper analyzes a model of social learning in a social network. Agents decide whether or not to adopt a new technology with unknown payoffs based on their prior beliefs and the experiences of their neighbors in the network. Using a mean-field approximation, we prove that the diffusion process always has at least one stable equilibrium, and we examine the dependence of the set of equilibria on the model parameters and the structure of the netw…

  • Network Architecture and the Left-Right Spectrum

    Dmitry Taubinsky•ARTICLE•2011

    We study a model of opinion formation and analyze the link between network architecture and the “left-right spectrum” that frequently characterizes opinions and beliefs. We correct a key result of DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (QJE, 2003) who claim that after some time, an agent’s position on a set of different issues will always be either “left” on all of those issues or “right” on all of those issues. We provide counterexamples to this claim and…

  • The Survival Assumption in Intertemporal Economies

    Jean‐marc Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc Bonnisseau et al.•ARTICLE•2011

    In an economy with a non-convex production sector, we provide an assumption on each individual producer, which implies that the survival assumption holds true at the aggregate level for general pricing rules. For the marginal pricing rule, we derive this assumption from the bounded marginal productivity of inputs. We apply this approach to intertemporal economies and we show how our assumption fits well with the time structure. We obtain a tracta…

  • Learning, Words and Actions

    Nicolas Jacquemet, Adam Zylbersztejn•ARTICLE•2013

    We experimentally study an asymmetric coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one is Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. We assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate the imperfect equilibrium. Our treatments involve three information-enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals: messages from partner or observation of his past choice…

  • Better Product Quality May Lead to Lower Product Price

    Regis Chenavaz•ARTICLE•2016

    This article analyzes the conditions under which better product quality implies higher or lower product price. In an optimal control framework, I make the following assumptions: The firm sets the dynamic pricing and product innovation policies; product innovation raises quality, which drives production cost, and consumers are sensitive to price and quality. I derive a rule of price-quality relationship that stresses the influence of quality on pr…

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae