Games and Economic Behavior
Journal Data
| Type | JOURNAL |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Academic Press Inc (US) |
| ISSN | 0899-8256 / 1090-2473 |
| Scopus | 14194 |
| Wikidata | Q5520105 |
| OpenAlex | S94044085 |
| MAG | 94044085 |
| Website | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622836/description#description |
| Total publications | 88 |
| Coverage period | 1989 - 2025 |
| Country | US |
| Language | EN |
| Indexing | Scopus indexed |
| Impact factor | 0.906 |
| SJR | 1.11 (Q1) |
| SNIP | 1.176 |
| CiteScore | 2.2 |
| Overton policy citations | 1 |
| Female authorship share | 20.1% |
This journal focuses on game theory and economic behavior, primarily from a quantitative and theoretical economics perspective. While it studies human behavior, its approach is distinct from the qualitative and interpretive methods of social anthropology
Economics and Econometrics · Finance · Auction Theory and Applications · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Digital Platforms and Economics · Diverse Scientific and Economic Studies
Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention
Endogenous barriers to learning
Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification
Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic …
Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions
Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital
Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avo…
Revealed deliberate preference change
An analytically solvable principal-agent model
We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse or risk neutral. The agent is free to choose any probability distribution over outcomes, where some distributions require more effort than others. The agent's effort-cost function is of “Legendre type” and satisfies an axiom of invariance under mergers of outcomes that are equally paid by the principal. We analyze a family of su…
Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives
This paper studies a multi-state binary choice experiment in which in each state, one alternative has well understood consequences whereas the other alternative has unknown consequences. Subjects repeatedly receive feedback from past choices about the consequences of unfamiliar alternatives but this feedback is aggregated over states. Varying the payoffs attached to the various alternatives in various states allows us to test whether unfamiliar a…
Cognitively-constrained learning from neighbors
An experiment on network density and sequential learning
The value of network information: Assortative mixing makes the difference
Cheap talk with coarse understanding
Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
Matching through institutions
Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation
Group targeting under networked synergies
On endogenous formation of price expectations
On the hardness of designing public signals
Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic
Propaganda and credulity
Incentives and cheating
No prominent publications on this page.
Potential Games
Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview
Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency
Economic Dynasties with Intermissions
A Value with Incomplete Communication
Bayesian learning in social networks
How to identify trust and reciprocity
A theory of sequential reciprocity
The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision
A theory of reciprocity
An experimental study of storable votes
In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents
Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups
Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter
David in Paris
Sharing information in Web communities
Elections with platform and valence competition
Ability and knowledge
Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes