Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting
Journal Data
| Type | SOURCE_BOOK |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (US) |
| ISBN-13 | 9780511896606 |
| Open Library | OL19195520W |
| Total publications | 10 |
| Coverage period | 1990 - 1990 |
| Language | EN |
| Cited by | 331 |
| h-index | 1 |
| i10-index | 1 |
This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.
Multicandidate Spatial Competition
The classical spatial model, first formulated by Hotelling (1929), focused on competition between two agents (interpreted either as business firms or political parties). Although competition between more than two agents was considered soon thereafter (for example, Chamberlain 1933), only in the last decade or so has sustained attention been paid to the multiagent case. This essay surveys the results of this attention, especially as regards compet…
Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections
We cannot have observations of deaths without observations of births. Riker (1976: 99) Political theories based on the spatial model have enjoyed a dual existence. As reflected in the title of Duncan Black's (1958) famous volume, the spatial model provides a foundation for the analysis of electoral phenomena and committee decision making. It does this by providing an abstract characterization of the outcomes and preferences common to electoral an…
Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model
What are the moving parts in the spatial model of politics? The formal theorems about equilibrium reveal nothing about moving parts. Black's median voter theorem simply identifies the equilibrium, given single-peaked utility curves, as the ideal point of the median voter (Black 1948, 1958). Plott's multidimensional extension of this theorem identifies the equilibrium, given convex utility curves, as the ideal point of the voter at the multidimens…
The Setter Model
Political processes that involve voting are invariably subject to an element of agenda control. Predictions about the outcomes of these processes can be made only if we specify (a) the preferences of the agenda setters, (b) the preferences of the voters, (c) institutional constraints on the process—the rules of the game, (d) the behavioral rules used by voters (are they sincere-myopic or sophisticated—forward looking), and (e) the information str…
Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences
INTRODUCTION In An Economic Theory of Democracy , Anthony Downs characterized a political party as a team whose goal is to win the election. Although such an assumption concerning political parties is a reasonable first step, it is open to two important criticisms. The party may not be a team, and the goal of the party leaders may not be to win the election. Consider the latter criticism. It would be strange if the voters were interested in polic…
Candidate Uncertainty and Electoral Equilibria
Enelow and Hinich (1990) have made it clear that the spatial theory of voting encompasses a large number of alternative models of committees and elections and deals with a large number of questions about these models. This particular essay is concerned with an important topic in the spatial theory of voting that has been addressed in a number of different references in the literature: the implications (for two-candidate elections) of candidate un…
The Theory of Predictive Mappings
The problem of instability in social choice is often thought to be eliminated when the possible set of choices is one-dimensional, and voters have single-peaked preferences over this set. This is Duncan Black's (1958) famous median voter result. Yet, even if votes are determined solely by preferences, instability may still result. If linkages exist in the voters' minds between each possible choice along this single dimension and a future choice o…
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees
The Euclidean representation of political issues and alternative outcomes, and the associated representation of preferences as quasiconcave utility functions, is by now a staple of formal models of committees and elections. This theoretical development, moreover, is accompanied by a considerable body of experimental research. We can view that research in two ways: as a test of the basic propositions about equilibria in specific institutional sett…
Advances in the spatial theory of voting
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting
This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental…
Multicandidate Spatial Competition
The classical spatial model, first formulated by Hotelling (1929), focused on competition between two agents (interpreted either as business firms or political parties). Although competition between more than two agents was considered soon thereafter (for example, Chamberlain 1933), only in the last decade or so has sustained attention been paid to the multiagent case. This essay surveys the results of this attention, especially as regards compet…
Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections
We cannot have observations of deaths without observations of births. Riker (1976: 99) Political theories based on the spatial model have enjoyed a dual existence. As reflected in the title of Duncan Black's (1958) famous volume, the spatial model provides a foundation for the analysis of electoral phenomena and committee decision making. It does this by providing an abstract characterization of the outcomes and preferences common to electoral an…
Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model
What are the moving parts in the spatial model of politics? The formal theorems about equilibrium reveal nothing about moving parts. Black's median voter theorem simply identifies the equilibrium, given single-peaked utility curves, as the ideal point of the median voter (Black 1948, 1958). Plott's multidimensional extension of this theorem identifies the equilibrium, given convex utility curves, as the ideal point of the voter at the multidimens…
The Setter Model
Political processes that involve voting are invariably subject to an element of agenda control. Predictions about the outcomes of these processes can be made only if we specify (a) the preferences of the agenda setters, (b) the preferences of the voters, (c) institutional constraints on the process—the rules of the game, (d) the behavioral rules used by voters (are they sincere-myopic or sophisticated—forward looking), and (e) the information str…
Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences
INTRODUCTION In An Economic Theory of Democracy , Anthony Downs characterized a political party as a team whose goal is to win the election. Although such an assumption concerning political parties is a reasonable first step, it is open to two important criticisms. The party may not be a team, and the goal of the party leaders may not be to win the election. Consider the latter criticism. It would be strange if the voters were interested in polic…
Candidate Uncertainty and Electoral Equilibria
Enelow and Hinich (1990) have made it clear that the spatial theory of voting encompasses a large number of alternative models of committees and elections and deals with a large number of questions about these models. This particular essay is concerned with an important topic in the spatial theory of voting that has been addressed in a number of different references in the literature: the implications (for two-candidate elections) of candidate un…
The Theory of Predictive Mappings
The problem of instability in social choice is often thought to be eliminated when the possible set of choices is one-dimensional, and voters have single-peaked preferences over this set. This is Duncan Black's (1958) famous median voter result. Yet, even if votes are determined solely by preferences, instability may still result. If linkages exist in the voters' minds between each possible choice along this single dimension and a future choice o…
A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees
The Euclidean representation of political issues and alternative outcomes, and the associated representation of preferences as quasiconcave utility functions, is by now a staple of formal models of committees and elections. This theoretical development, moreover, is accompanied by a considerable body of experimental research. We can view that research in two ways: as a test of the basic propositions about equilibria in specific institutional sett…
Advances in the spatial theory of voting
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting
This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental…