The Eurogroup

The Eurogroup: How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic Governance , by U. Puetter ( Manchester : Manchester University Press , 2006 , ISBN 9780719074035 ); 208pp. , £55 hb . This book is the first to study the Eurogroup, which was created in 1998 to assist in the informal decision-making of economic and monetary governance of the euro area. The Eurogroup meets before the Council of Ministers of Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) and consists of the Ministers of Finance of Member States of the euro area. Since 1998 this group has made many informal decisions that are subsequently formally adopted by Ecofin and, as such, has taken part of the workload off the plate of Ecofin. At the same time, its composition (a subset of Ecofin) and effectiveness (its ability to come to decisions – albeit still informal, unendorsed ones) have given rise to questions such as whether and how this form of informal governance is shaping the landscape of economic and monetary union (EMU) in the European Union (EU) when it is not a formal EU institution. In fact, the Eurogroup was only first mentioned in the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution and subsequently in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which has yet to be ratified. Despite the Eurogroup's apparent importance, and to date its weak institutional basis, the media has not provided it much coverage. If anything, its deliberations are covered by a veil of secrecy. Likewise academic writing has not kept up either. This book is the first to offer a systematic account of the operation of the Eurogroup and offers a look behind the scenes to see what goes on in this new important body of informal governance. Puetter takes up the challenge of writing about the Eurogroup by putting it in a broader perspective. He investigates how the very nature of the group – informality, voluntary participation and lack of ability to force any of its participants into accepting a particular view – contributes to its effectiveness. He adopts a constructivist analytical framework using it to explain the mechanisms behind how informal politics influences economic policy-making in the EU. He bases his analysis on existing documentation as well as interviews with key informants, many of whom are members of the Eurogroup either at the time or in the past. Based on his case study (of various sets of negotiations within the Eurogroup of a set of economic governance issues such as the Stability and Growth Pact) he offers an assessment of how the Eurogroup's informal working method can be interpreted as ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’ and what lessons can be learned for the EU at large. One of these lessons is that informal governance can be much more effective than is typically assumed. Another lesson is that the way out of EU deadlock need not necessarily be through supranational solutions. His overall conclusion is that regular informal dialogue among decision-makers is an effective instrument to improve economic governance in the EU (p. 170). Puetter has written a superb pioneering study of the Eurogroup. It is a must read for anyone who has an interest in learning more about economic and monetary governance in Europe. Theoretically informed and empirically rich, it also makes a major contribution to the general literature on European integration

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