A Stranger in Europe

A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair , by S. Wall ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 , ISBN 9780199284559 ); xiii + 230pp. , £20.00 hb . This is a combination of history and memoir: a historical account of a period dominated by treaty change, informed by Stephen Wall's own memories. Its structure is essentially chronological, its first chapter plunging into the post-1979 budget negotiations. Given his later argument that Britain's late entry was a key problem there is surprisingly little background. Seven more chronological chapters take the story from the Thatcher years, via episodes like the SEA, EMU and Maastricht, to the Constitutional Treaty. Two final chapters then pull things together by considering how British European policy is made and why it still has problems. Understandably the focus is on the twists and turns of high-level diplomacy with the UK's European partners. The author insists on the hugely varied factors which affect such policy-making, meaning that it is not really susceptible to rational, rule-based analysis. Personalities play a large role because of the way the Union has evolved towards leadership from the European Council. Wall has much to say about relationships with Chirac, Kohl, Schröder and others. All this can make it a hard read even though there are no notes. However, he sees two constants. One is the underlying historico-cultural distance of British opinion from European integration, something which can constrain policy-making as it did in the late 1990s, just as Blair sought to push a more open line. The other is the continuity of policy. The basic British stance of tough, pragmatic negotiation is justified as defending national interests, respecting popular feelings and making real contributions to European reform and problem solving. So, for him Margaret Thatcher is really the mother of the Single Market. But, if her intransigence was needed to make up for late entry, less aggression would have made things easier. He clearly sympathizes with Blair and, especially, Major and defends things often written off by critics like ‘Europe the Future’, the Declaration of Edinburgh and the Hampton Court Conference. Despite this he believes that British policy, made through a growing Cabinet Office staff and advanced co-ordination, could have been more successful had leaders been warmer in tone, more willing to explain and devise a more convincing and less negative story (perhaps using the European idea to camouflage its own interests) and less inclined both to oversell its achievements and pander to popular prejudice. So, even if the Commission and pro-integrationist leaders can be their own worst enemies, the country pays a price for its lack of commitment. So he is not optimistic about turning things round and making the British appreciate that the EU is now a place in which, in principle, it could feel comfortable. Nonetheless, students of Britain's politics and policy will find it a useful and stimulating source

Argument (complex analysis · Diplomacy · Economic history · European union · Foreign policy · Memoir · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Treaty · European Union Policy and Governance · History · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics