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The Enforcement of U.S. Economic Sanctions and Global De-risking Behavior

Bibliographic Data

ID10071488
AuthorsBryan R Early (0000-0003-1020-9302, University at Albany, SUNY, Albany, NY, USA), Timothy M Peterson (0000-0003-1159-4898, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, corresponding author)
Year2023
Publication date2023-11-22
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027231214748
OpenAlexW4388892751
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited32

Evidence suggests that firms frequently over-comply with U.S. sanctions—a process also known as “de-risking.” We argue that U.S. enforcement of its economic sanctions has contributed to this phenomenon to the extent that we can observe a systematic relationship between U.S. sanctions enforcement and third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets. Specifically, we theorize that, the greater the frequency and severity of sanctions enforcement penalties imposed by the U.S. against sanctions violators, the more third-party trade with U.S. sanction targets will decline. Analyzing data from 2003 to 2015, we find that U.S. sanctions enforcement actions correlate with significant declines in dyadic trade between third-party states and U.S. sanctions targets, even when enforcement actions target parties external to that dyad. This suggests that the U.S.’s enforcement of its sanctions magnifies the harm that U.S. sanctions inflict on target economies

Business · Economic sanctions · Economics · Enforcement · Harm · International trade · Law and economics · Political science · Sanctions · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law

  • Global value chain trade and sanction bypass

    Open Access•Aydin B Yildirim, J Tyson Chatagnier•Frontiers in Political Science•2025

  • The Currency Constraint

    Open Access•Navin R Bapat, Bryan R Early et al.•Foreign Policy Analysis•2024

  • Economic Sanctions and Sovereign Bond Ratings in the Developing World

    Open Access•G Biglaiser, Hoon Lee et al.•Foreign Policy Analysis•2025

  • Sanctioning as a goal unto itself

    Open Access•Suleyman Orhun Altiparmak, Cameron G Thies•Cambridge Review of International…•2025

  • Busted Sanctions

    Bryan R Early•Busted Sanctions•2020

  • Conform or challenge? Adjustment strategies of sanction‐torn companies

    Open Access•Patrick Maximilian Weber, Beata Stępień•World Economy•2020

  • United in Diversity? A Study on the Implementation of Sanctions in the European Union

    Open Access•Francesco Giumelli, Willem Geelhoed et al.•Politics and Governance•2022

  • States, firms, and security

    Open Access•Francesco Giumelli, Michal Onderco•European Journal of International…•2021

  • Economic Sanctions in Flux

    Open Access•Bryan R Early, Menevis Cilizoglu•International Studies Perspectives•2020

  • Imposing Sanctions

    Open Access•T Clifton Morgan, Tony Morgan et al.•International Studies Review•2003

  • Taking the cue

    Open Access•Timothy M Peterson•Conflict Management and Peace…•2013

  • The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions

    Open Access•David Lektzian, G Biglaiser•Conflict Management and Peace…•2013

  • The Peace Scale

    Open Access•James P Klein, Gary Goertz et al.•Conflict Management and Peace…•2008

  • Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005

    Open Access•T Clifton Morgan, Tony Morgan et al.•Conflict Management and Peace…•2014

  • Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance

    Daniel Drezner•International Interactions•2015

  • Enforcing US Economic Sanctions

    Bryan R Early, Keith Preble•The Washington Quarterly•2020

  • Weaponized Interdependence

    Open Access•Henry Farrell, Abraham L Newman•International Security•2019

  • The True Costs of Financial Sanctions

    AARON ARNOLD•Survival•2016

  • Does Punishing Sanctions Busters Work? Sanctions Enforcement and U.S. Trade with Sanctioned States

    Open Access•Bryan R Early, Timothy M Peterson•Political Research Quarterly•2021

  • The Effect of Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment

    Open Access•G Biglaiser, David Lektzian•International Organization•2011

  • Sanctioning Violence

    Open Access•Timothy M Peterson, A Cooper Drury•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2011

  • An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success

    Open Access•David Lektzian, Mark Souva•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2007

  • Sanctions and Third-party Compliance with US Foreign Policy Preferences

    Open Access•Timothy M Peterson•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2021

  • Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered

    Open Access•Navin A Bapat, T Clifton Morgan et al.•International Studies Quarterly•2009

  • Sending a Message

    Open Access•Timothy M Peterson•International Studies Quarterly•2013

  • Investment, Opportunity, and Risk

    Open Access•David Lektzian, G Biglaiser•International Studies Quarterly•2013

  • Profiting from Sanctions

    Open Access•Colin M Barry, Katja B Kleinberg•International Organization•2015

  • Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions

    Open Access•Daniel W Drezner, Daniel Drezner•International Organization•2000

  • When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework

    Open Access•Navin A Bapat, Bo Ram Kwon•International Organization•2015

  • Reputation and Interstate Conflict

    Open Access•Mark J C Crescenzi•American Journal of Political…•2007

  • Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales

    Bryan R Early, Keith A Preble et al.•Security Studies•2020

  • Sleeping with the Enemy

    Open Access•Katherine Barbieri, Jack S Levy•Journal of Peace Research•1999

Citations per year2
Citation span2024 - 2025 (2)
Highly citedNo

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