Port Access and Arms Sales
The Unspoken Quid Pro Quo
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071603 |
|---|---|
| Authors | W Ben Hunt (Harvard University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 335-365 |
| Publication date | 1990-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002790034002008 |
| OpenAlex | W2164408521 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This article examines the strategic use of arms sales by the Soviet Union. It is concerned with how the USSR, through its arms sales, rewards clients who give it what it wants and punishes clients who do not. This study identified grants of port access and, to a lesser degree, ability to pay in hard cash as the virtually exclusive determinants of variation in the contract terms of Soviet arms sales
Arms race · Business · Cash · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Port (circuit theory · Soviet union · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Finance · Law · Russia and Soviet political economy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |