Some Necessary Conditions for International Policy Coordination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071616 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin W Sampson (University of Minnesota, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 359-384 |
| Publication date | 1982-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002782026002008 |
| OpenAlex | W2056274635 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
N-actor cooperative game theory may be a useful body of knowledge for understanding aspects of international policy coalitions. Using a 1974 OPEC decision as an illustrative case, this article demonstrates that game theory is a source of ideas about necessary conditions for international policy coordination and also a means of testing those ideas with empirical data. The article considers three sets of possibly necessary conditions: the imputation, the core, and the convex game. The results of the empirical test are supportive of the core as a set of necessary conditions. The test is not supportive of the convex game, which substantively is a more interesting set of necessary conditions. The article concludes with observations about the policy relevance of knowing necessary conditions
Cooperative game theory · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Empirical research · Epistemology · Game theory · Imputation (statistics · Management science · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Regular polygon · Relevance (law · Set (abstract data type · Test (biology · Computer Science · European Union Policy and Governance · Game Theory and Voting Systems · International Development and Aid · Law · Mathematics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |