Coevolutionary Dynamics of Cultural Markers, Parochial Cooperation, and Networks
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071678 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jae-Woo Kim (0000-0002-5428-8789, Jeonbuk National University), Robert A Hanneman (Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA), Robert Hanneman (University of California, Riverside) |
| Ano | 2012 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 226-253 |
| Data de publicação | 2012-12-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712468691 |
| OpenAlex | W2116420200 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
| Referências citadas | 49 |
The emergence and institutionalization of cooperation in sizable groups without reciprocity receives considerable attention in game-theoretical modeling. Agents in our study play the Prisoner’s Dilemma game cooperating with tolerably similar neighbors. They may imitate cultural markers (tags) and tolerance from more successful neighbors. Alternatively, they break ties to out-group neighbors. New partners are selected either from neighbors’ neighbors (clustering) or randomly. Variations in network plasticity (the likelihood of changing partners rather than being influenced) and clustering are explored. With high plasticity and high clustering, networks tend to fragment. With low plasticity and low clustering, networks tend toward global cooperation, but with severe losses of cultural diversity and tolerance. Cooperation in such regimes also proves to be vulnerable to defection. Between, there is a space displaying relatively stable and widespread cooperation with diversity and tolerance. We note some important structural characteristics of the networks evolving in this space
Alliance · Cluster analysis · Cultural diversity · Dilemma · Diversity (politics · Economic geography · Economics · Epistemology · Institutionalisation · Political science · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Social dilemma · Sociology · Space (punctuation) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Plant and animal studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Similarity attraction and actually selecting similar others
Social Dilemmas
Persistent parochialism
Why Imitate, and If So, How?
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange
The Division of Labor in Society
Social identity and intergroup relations
Chapter 6 Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory
A Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies
The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity
Computational Simulation as Theoretical Experiment
Dynamic models of segregation
Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma
Consent or Conflict
Social identity and intergroup behaviour
Evolution of Cultural Groups and Persistent Parochialism
Birds of a Feather
Social Dilemmas
Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks
The Strength of Weak Ties
Social Markers and the Evolution of Reciprocal Exchange
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,11 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |