Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10071717
AutoresBrock F Tessman (Department of Political Science, University of Colorado), Steve Chan (0000-0001-9536-8315, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado)
Ano2004
Volume48
Fascículo2
Páginas131-153
Data de publicação2004-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002703262857
OpenAlexW2036799321
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas42

The theory of power cycles contends that the growth and decline of national power holds the key to understanding the occurrence of extensive wars. Certain critical points in a state’s power trajectory are especially dangerous occasions for such armed clashes. The power cycles of nine major states during the period from 1816 to 1995 are examined, and prospect theory is used to derive expectations about the risk propensity of states during different periods in their power cycle. These expectations are in turn applied to an analysis of deterrence encounters among the major states. Results show that critical points tend to incline states to initiate deterrence confrontations and escalate them to war. Democratic states, however, are less susceptible to these tendencies than authoritarian ones. Results also show that changes in power trajectories do affect the occurrence and outcome of deterrence encounters among the great powers

Authoritarianism · Democracy · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence