Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories
An Empirical Comparison in Four-Person Superadditive Sidepayment Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071810 |
|---|---|
| Authors | H Andrew Michener (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Daniel J Myers (0000-0002-0393-0110, University of Notre Dame) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 830-860 |
| Publication date | 1998-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002798042006007 |
| OpenAlex | W1981805828 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 27 |
This article reports a comparative test of the central-union theory in four-person sidepayment games. Predictions by two variants of central-union theory (CU-1 and CU-2) are tested vis-à-vis predictions by three other solutions (the equal excess model, the Myerson-Shapley solution, and the kernel). With respect to players' payoffs, results show that CU-1, CU-2, equal excess, and Myerson-Shapley models have essentially equal predictive accuracy and that all of these are superior to the kernel in the test games. However, when coalition structure probability predictions are incorporated in the test, both CU-1 and CU-2 emerge as more accurate than all the other models tested
Combinatorics · Econometrics · Economics · Kernel (algebra · Mathematical economics · Probabilistic logic · Statistics · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
Applied Game Theory
The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
A probabilistic theory of coalition formation in n ‐person sidepayment games
The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
The Shapley Value
When three is not always two against one
Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining
Evaluating Coalition Theories
Nonsymmetry and Core Size in N-Person Sidepayment Games
Mollifier Representation in Non-Constant-Sum Games
Effects of prior experience on coalition bargaining
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2007 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |