Same Game, New Tricks
What Makes a Good Strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071831 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrzej Pelc (0000-0003-0598-1218, Département d'informatique Université du Québec en Outaouais, Gatineau, Québec), Krzysztof J Pelc (0000-0001-8122-0539, Department of Government Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 774-793 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002709339045 |
| OpenAlex | W2057059921 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
The aim of this article is to distinguish between strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma on the basis of their relative performance in a given population set. We first define a natural order on such strategies that disregards isolated disturbances, by using the limit of time-average payoffs. This order allows us to consider one strategy as strictly better than another in some population of strategies. We then determine a strategy σ to be ‘‘robust,’’ if in any population consisting of copies of two types of strategies, σ itself and some other strategy τ, the strategy σ is never worse than τ. We present a large class of such robust strategies. Strikingly, robustness can accommodate an arbitrary level of generosity, conditional on the strength of subsequent retaliation; and it does not require symmetric retaliation. Taken together, these findings allow us to design strategies that significantly lessen the problem of noise, without forsaking performance. Finally, we show that no strategy exhibits robustness in all population sets of three or more strategy types
Dilemma · Game theory · Generosity · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Mathematical optimization · Population · Prisoner's dilemma · Robustness (evolution · Strategic dominance · Computer Science · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics
Evolution and the Theory of Games
The Limits of Safety
Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions
Theory of international politics
Reciprocity and Shared Knowledge Structures in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
Conflict And Cooperation in International Relations
Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains
How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Optimal Retaliation for Optimal Cooperation
Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Sheep in Sheep's clothing
The Limits of Safety
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |