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Assessing the Role of Corruption in Shaping Conflict Outcomes

Bibliographic Data

ID10071842
AuthorsEric Keels (0000-0001-7006-442X, Center for Strategy and Technology, U.S. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, USA, corresponding author), J Michael Greig (0000-0003-2092-5388, University of North Texas)
Year2025
Publication date2025-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027251374195
OpenAlexW4413893759
LanguageEN
References cited52

While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy

Criminology · Development economics · Economics · Language change · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology

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