The Volunteer’s Dilemma with Cost Synergies
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071882 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Rabah Amir (0000-0003-4971-8438, University of Iowa), Dominika Machowska (0000-0002-2330-3309, University of Warsaw), Jingwen Tian (0000-0002-7805-6181, Wuhan University) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-10-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027251388601 |
| OpenAlex | W4415273975 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 21 |
This paper revisits the well-known volunteer’s dilemma on the production of a public good when a single participant is sufficient for the task. We propose a cost-sharing model with a volunteering cost that decreases exponentially in the number of volunteers. We show that, at the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability of production may increase in the number of players for sufficiently low volunteering costs. This provides an alternative account of the fit of the model with some political-military conflict situations: A larger group does erode the individual incentive to volunteer but in an offsetting way that favors the production of the public good. A second result is that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium may be more socially efficient than the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for some parameter values, which is a major reversal with respect to the standard dilemma and many other coordination games
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Religion and Society Interactions
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods
The simple analytics of the environmental Kuznets curve
The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare
From weakest-link to best-shot
The Kitty Genovese murder and the social psychology of helping
Incomplete Information and Timing in the Volunteer's Dilemma
Volunteer's Dilemma
Cost Sharing in a Volunteer's Dilemma
Asymmetry and Timing in the Volunteer's Dilemma
On the private provision of public goods
Multiple teams and the volunteer's dilemma
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |