The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870-1915
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10072756 |
|---|---|
| Authors | T H E Travers, Tim Travers (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 531-553 |
| Publication date | 1978-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200947801300307 |
| OpenAlex | W2018755534 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
In January 1910, at the annual Staff College conference of General Staff officers, the Director of Staff Duties, Brigadier General Kiggell, remarked that after the South African war (1899-1902) the War Office had come to the conclusion that fire power was the decisive factor in battle, and that therefore the sword and bayonet were out. 'But this idea is erroneous', declared Kiggell, 'and was proved to be so in the late war in Manchuria [1904-1905] Everyone admits that. Victory is now won actually by the bayonet, or by the fear of it.' At the same conference the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir William Nicholson, pointed out that formal doctrine now no longer stated 'the decision is obtained by superiority of fire', but instead 'a superiority of fire makes the decision possible.'l In the years immediately before the first world war, therefore, and at the highest levels, the British army was turning against the concept of fire power as the central factor in modern war, and towards more traditional principles.2 This attitude was not so strong as to prevent the War Office from experimenting with automatic rifles and machine guns, nor was there lacking a solid core of fire power supporters such as Major McMahon and Captain J.F.C Fuller, while the musketry training of the British Expeditionary Force certainly reached high levels before 1914. But fundamentally, the lessons of fire power as demonstrated in South Africa and Manchuria were not taken fully to heart, and indeed a regression took place between 1900 and 1914. Why should this be so? Possible answers may emerge from studying the debate on the introduction and development of a weapon that was the essence of fire power the machine gun.3 After noting the initial reaction of
Economics · Management · Offensive · Political science · History · Military History and Strategy · Military, Security, and Education Studies
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2008 (30) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |